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Political knowledge is an important factor in understanding voting behavior, particu-
larly when voters￿policy positions con￿ ict with those of their favored candidate. In this
paper, we use the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) for the 2004 U.S. election to
directly estimate voters￿ideological positions, candidates￿ideological positions, and voters￿
knowledge of candidates￿ideological positions. We then analyze the relationship between
these estimates and the individual￿ s vote in the 2004 presidential election. The NAES
asks voters for their own stances and for the candidates￿stances on speci￿c policy issues.
Because candidates￿stances on these policies are known, the data allow us to (1) esti-
mate voters￿knowledge levels using item response theory, and (2) simultaneously estimate
the positions of voters and candidates on the same spectrum. Typically, in the empirical
literature, individuals￿ideological positions are taken from self-reported placement on an
ideological spectrum. Here, we use Poole and Rosenthal￿ s (1985, 2000) spatial model to
estimate ideological positions, treating individuals￿opinions as Poole and Rosenthal treat
roll-call data for legislators. This method recovers the underlying ideological space while
avoiding the perception issues associated with self-placement. Assuming that voters prefer
to vote for the candidate whose ideological position is closer to their own, we ￿nd that more
knowledgeable individuals are far less likely to vote for the candidate farther from them.
Moreover, signi￿cantly more voters vote "mistakenly" for Bush than for Kerry. Though a
majority of voters have ideological positions closer to Kerry, Bush receives more votes due
to this pattern of mistakes.
JEL classi￿cation: C13, D72, D82, D83.
￿We are indebted to Antonio Merlo for his guidance and support. We would also like to thank Arianna
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11 INTRODUCTION 2
In view of the fact that very few Americans have any deep interest in politics, it is a mild
paradox that party loyalties should be so widespread. A partial key to this puzzle is that
these identications perform for the citizen an exceedingly useful evaluative function. To
the average person the aairs of government are remote and complex, and yet the average
citizen is asked...to decide how he will vote, what choice he will make between candidates
oering dierent programs and very dierent versions of contemporary political events. In
this dilemma, having the party symbol stamped on certain candidates, on certain positions,
on certain interpretations of political reality is of great psychological convenience.
-Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order1
1 Introduction
For many years, an overwhelming majority of Americans have called themselves either Democrats
or Republicans. Even among individuals who claim to be independent, most have acknowledged
having some one-sided party loyalty. Campbell et al. (1966, pg. 126) observe that \not more
than a tenth of the public sees itself at the point of full independence." Almost 40 years later,
Romer et al. (2006) still nd that 90% of Americans either call themselves Democrats or Re-
publicans or lean towards one of the parties.
On the other hand, very few Americans have deep-seeded interest in the political process,
and most know very little about government policies. Campbell et al. (1960) describe \...an
electorate almost wholly without detailed information about decision making in government,
[which] knows little about what government has done...or what parties propose to do...knowing
little of particular policies and what has led to them."
Indeed, many voters are unaware of what the relevant issues are surrounding a political
campaign.2 Even many of those who can identify the issues do not take the time to learn
candidates' proposed policies or positions regarding those issues. This behavior does not imply
that voters are incapable of making decisions using complex information regarding policies.
Many voters may be unwilling to pay the cost of gathering such complex information. According
to Campbell et al. (1960, pg. 543{544), very few people are \motivated strongly enough to obtain
the information needed to develop a sensitive understanding of decision making in government."
One explanation for this lack of motivation is the presence of simpler pieces of evidence{
labels such as political party{which voters can use to infer conclusions about candidates' policy
positions. In conjunction with the unawareness regarding issues, the high level of party iden-
tication suggests that many individuals form opinions about candidates based only on their
political party, rather than their positions on specic policy issues. In an experimental study,
Rahn (1993) found that individuals are perfectly capable of using complex evidence to form
accurate opinions about policy positions of candidates when this complex evidence is all they
have on which to rely. However, given the same complex evidence and the political party of the
candidates, people use the political party to stereotype the candidates, even in cases of extreme
1Campbell et al. (1966, pg. 126)
2Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, pg. 10) write that \the concept of political knowledge is at the center of the
critique of the promise and performance of American democracy", adding that they are joining many political
theorists and practitioners throughout the ages in making such a claim.1 INTRODUCTION 3
party-issue inconsistency. Even when information is available for free, people tend to use labels
to draw conclusions about candidates' positions.3
Voters forming opinions about candidates based only on political party can partially explain
why party identication is such a strong indicator of voting behavior. Perhaps more importantly,
the use of such a short cut suggests that there may be a disconnect between a voter's opinion of a
candidate and her opinion of the candidate's actual policy positions. There are several empirical
studies of voter behavior which have relied on voters' self-reported political positions. Of these
empirical studies, Palfrey and Poole (1987) is the best example of a paper which analyzes the
relationship between knowledge, ideology and voting behavior. While providing several useful
insights, Palfrey and Poole (1987) and others shed no light on the relationship between voters'
opinions and knowledge regarding specic policy issues.
In this paper, we aim to analyze the relationship between political knowledge, ideological
position and voting behavior using data regarding specic policy issues to measure both political
knowledge and political knowledge levels of individuals. To do so, we use the 2004 National
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) to directly measure (1) citizens' knowledge of candidates'
positions on specic policy issues and (2) citizens' and candidates' ideological positions. The
NAES asks individuals their opinions regarding a set of policy issues relevant to the 2004 pres-
idential election. Furthermore, it asks the same individuals what they think the candidates'
positions are on some of the very same issues. Because the candidates' actual positions are
known, it is possible to assess individuals' political knowledge regarding the specic policies.
Just as signicantly, the candidates' known positions allow us to also estimate the candidates'
political positions, treating them just like the other citizens and yielding a political position on
the same scale as those of the other individuals.
To estimate individuals' ideological positions, we use the W-NOMINATE algorithm devel-
oped by Poole and Rosenthal (1985) to construct measures of legislators' ideological positions
from their voting records. To apply this method, we treat citizens as legislators and their opin-
ions on policy issues as roll call votes. Though this and related methods are commonly applied
to the U.S. Congress and other legislative bodies,4 we believe that this is the rst application of
the method to data on citizens.
We construct a continuous measure of individuals' overall knowledge of candidates' policy
positions. These estimates are calculated using each surveyed individual's answers to a series of
questions regarding candidates' opinions on particular policy issues.5 To ease analysis of voting
patterns, we use cluster analysis on these scores to dierentiate between information status
groups. Because the NAES wrote questions to reect the issues being discussed in the campaign
at that moment in time, individuals were asked dierent questions depending on the time of
3The Rahn (1993) experiment suggests that the cost of gathering information does not fully explain why
voters use labels to draw conclusions about candidates. While the relevant fact for our purposes is that many
voters rely on labels (rather than why they rely on them), the results in Rahn (1993) are useful in highlighting
that the phenomenon of not using information regarding specic policies is not restricted to those voters who
do not have the information.
4See Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Poole and Rosenthal
2004
5Nearly all of the questions are of the form \Does Bush or Kerry favor...". Implicit in the question is the
suggestion that only one of the two candidates supports the policy. Indeed, this is true in all instances save
one, and that question was the most commonly missed. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between knowledge of
Kerry's and Bush's opinions.1 INTRODUCTION 4
their interview. Item Response Theory (IRT) allows us to compare scores for individuals who
took dierent tests.6
It is important to highlight the dierence between our methods and those in the existing
literature. We recover individuals' ideological position from opinions regarding policy issues.
This is in contrast to the abstract political spectra used by Palfrey and Poole (1987) which are
independent of actual policies. In their study, the only indicator of individuals' political position
other than party identication is their so-called \thermometer scores", which are individuals'
self-assessments of their position on a left-right scale. One known shortcoming of relying on
thermometer scores is that surveyed individuals may not have the same perception of the left-
right scale. For example, voters may assess where they stand relative to others they know and
have very dierent views of what is \normal". While methods have been developed to deal with
such \distortion" issues, it is still impossible to tell how two such voters would compare in an
abstract ideological space with a standardized scale.7
Furthermore, we directly measure individuals' political knowledge of candidates' positions.
In Palfrey and Poole (1987), political knowledge does not come from an individual's level of
awareness of policy issues. Instead, they use \perceptual data"{individuals' thoughts as to how
liberal or conservative certain politicians are on an abstract left-right scale. Both Palfrey and
Poole (1987) and several other studies use data from the National Election Survey (NES), which
does not question citizens regarding candidates' positions on specic policy issues. In contrast,
because both citizens' opinions and their knowledge of candidates are solicited by the NAES
through questions about specic policies, we can nally shed some light on the relationship
between voters' opinions and knowledge regarding these issues.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Of the 3,148 individuals for whom we estimate
ideological position and political knowledge, 1,608 voters (51.1%) voted for Bush, closely match-
ing the 50.73% from the actual election results. We nd that 78% of voters are closer to Kerry
than to Bush in their estimated ideological position. Overall, 65% of individuals vote for the
candidate closer to them in the ideological space. This proportion diers greatly across indi-
viduals with dierent ideological positions and dierent levels of political knowledge. Of the
individuals who vote for the candidate who is ideologically farthest from them, 91% are closer
to Kerry and vote for Bush, while only the remaining 9% are closer to Bush and vote for Kerry.
This striking dierence in turn leads to the discrepancy between the fraction of voters closer
to Kerry (78%) and the fraction of voters who actually for Kerry (49%). Signicantly, political
knowledge plays a large role in the proportion of voters who vote for the candidate closest to
them. When divided into ve groups based on level of political knowledge, the proportion voting
for the closer candidate strictly increases from 42% for the least informed group to 85% for the
most informed group.
Individuals' party identication is related to their voting behavior as expected: Republicans
are much more likely to vote for Bush and Democrats for Kerry. Indeed, of the many Bush
voters who are ideologically closer to Kerry, 81% identify as Republican or lean Republican.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between demographic variables and voting for the far-
6Item response theory is a class of models used in the construction of psychometric measures and analysis of
test score data. We employ the most basic, single parameter model. See (Baker 2001) for an introduction to
item response theory.
7One method which deals with distorted perceptions is the Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling Procedure, used by
Palfrey and Poole (1987).2 EMPIRICAL MODEL 5
ther candidate. Surprisingly, correlation for many demographic variables is not distinguishable
from zero in all specications.While it is well established that demographic variables and party
identication predict voting behavior, it is noteworthy that our estimates of ideological position
and information status have explanatory power beyond these measures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical model and the methods
we use for estimating both ideological position and political knowledge. Section 3 describes the
data and interprets our estimates of ideological position and information status. Our results
analyzing voting patterns across information groups and ideological position are presented in
detail in section 4. Section 5 concludes. Tables not included in the body of the paper can be
found in the Appendix.
2 Empirical model
The National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) has an unusual structure that will aect our
identication of the theoretical model.8 Individuals i 2 N = f1;:::;ng; were interviewed before
the election using dierent, overlapping questionnaires.9 Some of these individuals N0  N were
re-interviewed after the election. This structure requires us to adopt methods that deal well
with missing data.
We observe voting behavior vi for those individuals who were re-interviewed after the election
and voted. We estimate individual information status si for all individuals in the pre-election
sample and estimate ideological position yi{taking both to be exogenous latent variables{for all
individuals for whom we have voting data. Using observations of yi; si and vi, we investigate
the proposition that individuals vote for the candidate they believe to be closer to them in our
policy metric by examining relationships between these variables.
Discussion of the estimation techniques for ideological position and information status follow
in section 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
2.1 Ideological Position
To estimate individuals' ideological positions, we use the W-NOMINATE algorithm developed
by Poole and Rosenthal (1985) to construct measures of legislators' ideological positions from
their voting records. To apply this method, we treat citizens as legislators and their opinions
on policy issues as roll call votes. Though this and related methods are commonly applied to
the U.S. Congress and other legislative bodies, we believe that this is the rst application of the
method to data on citizens.
The 2004 NAES codebook contains information on the candidates' positions on many of the
same policy issues on which citizens were polled. Therefore, we can construct observations of
opinion data for the two candidates and, treating them as citizens, estimate their ideological
positions as we estimate the citizens' ideological positions.
We present the algorithm generally, assuming a multi-dimensional policy space. Suppose
that individuals' ideological positions yi 2 Y are vectors of length Q. Individuals' opinions on
8See Romer et al. (2006) for details of the survey design and suggested analysis.
9The questionnaires varied according to the date of interview, which was randomly distributed over the
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policy issues ik; are observed for issues k = 1;:::;K, where 0 and 1 represent opposing and
favoring the issue, respectively. Each of these issues k is associated with two potential policy
outcomes, O0k;O1k; which lie in the ideological space Y.
Individual i favors issue k if the utility from favoring exceeds the utility form opposing.
Individual i's utility from favoring k follows a random utility model
U(O1k;yi) = u(O1k;yi) + 1ik; where









Utility from opposing is dened analogously. Notice that the deterministic portion of the utility
function is an exponential transformation of a distance metric. This specication implies that
u(O1k;yi)  u(O0k;yi) if yi is closer to the outcome position O1k than it is to O0k in terms
of this metric. Moreover, the expontential transformation implies that the individual does not
distinguish as carefully between outcome positions that are far from her bliss point.
We assume a logit specication, so that





In expectation, the dierence between the error terms is zero and the individual is more likely
to favor the outcome that is closer to her. The two outcome positions dene a cut-plane that
separates the ideological positions expected to favor and oppose the issue. Notice that the
cutting planes for all the dierent issues divide up the space into regions.
Since both the individual position and issue outcome parameters are unobserved, the algo-
rithm to estimate the parameters is iterative. After nding some starting value for ideological
position and assuming some starting values for  and w, we estimate the parameters of the
issues. Taking these parameters as given, we re-estimate the ideological positions. Then we es-
timate the utility parameters. Having estimated each set of parameters, we re-estimate them in
the same way. We continue in this process until the parameters converge. To calculate standard
errors, we use parametric bootstrapping.10
2.2 Knowledge of Candidates' Policy Positions
Each individual answered a series of questions measuring her knowledge of candidates' opinions
on particular policy issues. From these data, we construct a continuous measure of individuals'
overall knowledge of candidates' policy positions.11 We assume that individuals who have the
10Lewis and Poole (2004) introduce and analyzes using parametric bootstrapping to measure uncertainty
in ideological positions. The W-NOMINATE program with parametric bootstrapping can be found at http:
//voteview.com/w-nominate_Parametric_Bootstrap.htm.
11Nearly all of the questions are of the form \Does Bush or Kerry favor...". Implicit in the question is the
suggestion that only one of the two candidates supports the policy. Indeed, this is true in all instances save
one, and that question was the most commonly missed. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between knowledge of
Kerry's and Bush's opinions.2 EMPIRICAL MODEL 7
same distribution of beliefs over candidates' ideological positions will have similar knowledge
scores. Therefore, we use cluster analysis on these scores to dierentiate between information
status groups.
Because the NAES wrote questions to reect the issues being discussed in the campaign at
that moment in time, individuals were asked dierent questions depending on the time of their
interview. Item Response Theory (IRT) allows us to compare scores for individuals who took
dierent tests.12
Let j = 1;:::;J index the set of all knowledge questions, and denote the knowledge questions
individual i was asked by Ji  f1;:::;Jg: Individual i's score for her answer to question j 2 Ji
is denoted by xij 2 f0;1g, where 0 is correct and 1 is incorrect.
Suppose that each individual's underlying knowledge of candidates' opinions on policy issues
is some value i 2 R; that each question j has a level of diculty bj, and that the probability
that individual i answers question j correctly follows the logistic distribution
Pfxij = 1g =
1
1 + e (i bj):
This specication has two latent variables: knowledge (i) and the diculty of the question (bj).
Given estimated levels of diculty ^ bj for j = 1;:::;J, we can estimate i for each i; similarly,
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#
;(5)
where Ij  f1;:::;ng is the set of individuals who answered question j.
As in the W-NOMINATE algorithm, we estimate both latent variables iteratively, according
to the following algorithm:
1. Choose a starting value of bj, denoted ^ b0
j, for j = 1;:::;J.
2. Given f^ b
m 1
j gJ
j=1, estimate ^ m
i by maximizing equation (4)for i = 1;:::;n.
3. Given f^ m
i gn
i=1, estimate ^ bm
j by maximizing equation (5) for j = 1;:::;J.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the estimates no longer change.
The trick to applying this algorithm is selecting a starting point. We do this by normalizing
the mean level of knowledge to 0, dening ^ p0j to be the proportion of people correctly answering
12Item response theory is a class of models used in the construction of psychometric measures and analysis of
test score data. We employ the most basic, single parameter model. See Baker (2001) for an introduction to
item response theory.3 DATA AND ESTIMATION 8
question j, and solving equation (??) as follows:
^ p0j = Pfxij = 1ji = 0g (6)
=
1









for j = 1;:::;J.
Because this iterative approach does not allow us to use the standard errors from the maxi-
mum likelihood estimations, we bootstrap standard error perimetrically, using a similar approach
as we did for the ideological position estimates.
3 Data and Estimation
The 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey interviewed 81,422 people between October 7,
2003 and November 16, 2004. The entire sample is called the National Rolling Cross-Section,
where "rolling" indicates that interviews were ongoing and that the survey questions changed
over time to reect campaign issues. The interviews were conducted by random digit dialing
with a response rate of 22%. Of the 34,062 interviewed between July 14, 2004 and the election,
20,000 people were randomly selected to be reinterviewed after the election as part of the Election
Panel. Re-interviews were completed with 8,664 people, which is a 43% response rate. Because
we only need pre-election data to estimate ideological position and information status, we can
use the larger National Rolling Cross-Section sample for these estimates.
The general election campaign eectively started on March 9, 2004 when Kerry mathemat-
ically secured the Democratic nomination. Ideally, we would estimate ideological position yi
from opinion data on the 24,224 people who were interviewed from March 9 to November 1 and
who provided at least 10 responses to opinion questions. However, getting starting values for
that many people proved infeasible for this version of the paper, and we present today estimates
of yi from opinion data on the 3,100 people who were interviewed from March 9 to November
1, provided at least 10 responses to opinion questions and were reinterviewed after the elec-
tion. Because the knowledge survey questions changed abruptly over over the general election
campaign period, we only consider people interviewed from April 19 to November 1 and who
provided at least 7 responses to knowledge questions. Because the irt algorithm does not allow
us to estimate the knowledge parameters for people who scored 0% or 100%, we estimate values
for the remainder of the remaining 25,217 people.
Of the people whose voting decisions we observe, we have estimates of i and yi for 3,148
people. Using these observations yi , si , and vi, we analyze the relationship between voting
behavior, ideological position, and political knowledge. These results are presented in Section
4.
3.1 Ideological Position
We estimate two-dimensional ideological positions for citizens (yi) and candidates (yp) using
opinions on policy issues including various tax issues, minimum wage, union organizing, free3 DATA AND ESTIMATION 9
trade, health insurance, prescription drugs, military issues (not focused on Iraq), abortion, same-
sex marriage, gun control and lawsuits.13 In addition to these policy positions, we estimate the
parameters of the distance metric for ideological space and the outcome positions for each of the
issues. These parameters allow us to interpret the meaning of regions in the ideological s.pace.
To understand the orientation and interpretation of the dimensions of the ideological space,
we investigate the cutplanes that separate those policy positions more likely to favor from those
more likely to oppose a particular issue. Our specication of the utility function in equation
(1) implies that individuals are more likely to favor the outcome that is closer to them in the
distance metric




which allows us to dene the cutplane as the set of points in the ideological space equidistant
from the two ideological positions. We can use a similar approach to dene the set of policy





































-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Position, dimension 1
Voters Bush Kerry
Idelogical Space Divided by Distance from Candidates
Figure 1: Ideological space divided by distance from candidates. The dashed lines are the
midpoints between candidates position in each dimension. The red line is the cutplane generated
by treating candidates' positions as policy outcomes
Our estimates show that Bush is extreme in both dimensions: he is far to the right on the
rst dimension and down in the second dimension. Kerry, meanwhile, is pretty far to the left
on the rst dimension ideological spectrum but moderate in the second dimension. Figure 1
provides more details on the candidates' ideological positions. As you can see in this gure, the
vast majority of voters (78%) are closer to Kerry than to Bush using the estimated distance
metric. Considering only the rst dimension, this proportion falls: 67% of voters are closer to
Kerry than to Bush in the rst dimension.
13Wording of these policy questions can be found in the Appendix, Table 93 DATA AND ESTIMATION 10
We interpret the rst dimension as the left-right ideological spectrum with which we are
familiar. The second dimension serves to rationalize common inversions in opinion. In particular,
it allows some individuals to be generally liberal but conservative on social issues and vice versa.
Figure 2 shows issues' cutplanes dividing the ideological space, the distribution of voters within
that space and the location of the two candidates. As you can see in Table 8 and Figure
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Position, dimension 1
Voters Minimum Wage
Union Organizing Free Trade
Gov. Health Ins. for Kids Gov. Health Ins. for Workers
Medicare Prescription Law Medicare Drugs from Canada
Social Security in Stocks Bush
Kerry
Worker's Rights, Health Care and Social Security
Ideological Space Divided by Other Issues
Figure 2: Ideological space divided by issue cutplanes
Voters' policy positions are distributed very close to zero in the rst dimension and widely
dispersed in the second. To summarize voters' policy positions, we ran a cluster analysis iden-
tifying similar subgroups within the ideological space. Figure 3 displays the regions occupied
by these clusters, and Table 1 summarizes the expected opinions of individuals in each cluster.
Clusters 1-3 are center to right in the rst dimension, diering primarily along the second di-
mension. Clusters 4 and 5 are left on the rst dimension, with cluster 4 above 5 in the second
dimension.
Moving from cluster 1 to cluster 3, i.e. decreasing the value of y2, individuals are more likely
to favor federal funding of research using stem cells from human embryos and less likely to favor
increasing the minimum wage. Though clusters 4 and 5 clusters agree on most issues, cluster
4 is more likely to favor restricting abortion and moving troops currently stationed in Europe
and Korea to other locations. Moving left, from from clusters 1-3 to clusters 4 and 5, decreases3 DATA AND ESTIMATION 11
the probability that the individual favors making union organizing easier and opposes investing
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Position, dimension 1
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Group 4 Group 5 Stem Cell 1
Moving Troops Social Sec.  in Stocks Union Org.
Restricting Abortion Minimum Wage
Idelogical Space Divided into Clusters
Figure 3: Ideological space divided by ideological clusters
To summarize the uncertainty in our estimates of ideological position, we calculate classi-
cation rates that measure the probability that an individual who truly falls in a given cluster
will be estimated to be in another. Table 2 presents these statistics, summarizing the results
of the parametric bootstrap. Recall that each individual's position is estimated from as few
as 10 opinions. The classication rates quantify the error in the estimates from this and other
sources. These rates demonstrate that the rst dimension is estimated much more precisely
than the second dimension.
3.2 Political Knowledge
We estimate a continuous measure of citizens' knowledge of candidates' ideological position
using 30 questions on candidates' positions on an overlapping set of issues from the opinion
data. Citizens answered between 7 and 14 questions, with the average citizen answering 10. The3 DATA AND ESTIMATION 12
Table 1: Average probability of favoring an issue by ideological cluster
Ideological Cluster
1 2 3 4 5 all
PfFavor Stem Cell Funding (Wording #1)g 0.23 0.78 0.97 0.84 1.00 0.73
PfFavor Moving Troops From Europe and Koreag 0.91 0.68 0.34 0.78 0.31 0.64
PfFavor Social Security in Stock Marketg 0.32 0.76 0.93 0.08 0.04 0.60
PfFavor Making Union Organizing Easierg 0.83 0.49 0.22 0.92 0.90 0.56
PfFavor Making Abortion More Dicultg 0.94 0.39 0.04 0.41 0.01 0.40
PfFavor Increasing Minimum Wageg 0.99 0.84 0.39 1.00 0.99 0.78
Table 2: Summary of voter's ideological position by cluster
The \classied in cluster" column gives the average proportion of bootstrap iterations that fall
within a particular cluster. Hence row 1 can be interpreted as the probability that an individual
who truly falls within cluster 1 will be estimated to be in each of the other clusters.
Classed in Cluster
Ideological Cluster Freq. Prop E(y1) E(y2) 1 2 3 4 5
1 663 0.21 0.121 0.807 0.30 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.04
2 1,162 0.37 0.111 -0.004 0.31 0.42 0.30 0.16 0.11
3 815 0.26 0.079 -0.665 0.26 0.26 0.38 0.19 0.18
4 379 0.12 -0.201 0.480 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.37 0.33
5 131 0.04 -0.647 -0.180 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.34
Total 3,150 0.00 0.036 0.0463 DATA AND ESTIMATION 13
variation in the number of questions answered is entirely due to the date that the individual was
interviewed. If an individual either said she did not know the answer to or refused to answer a
knowledge question, we mark that question as incorrectly answered.14
The questions with the highest degree of diculty (highest value of b) include several issues
for which at least one of the candidates's positions is not consistent with party stereotypes. The
question regarding the assault weapons ban is particularly dicult, mostly because the correct
answer{that both candidates favor it{is not one that most individuals expect to be correct for
any of the questions. Questions about candidates' signature issues, like Bush's tax cuts and
funding for the Iraq war, are among the easiest. Table 10 presents the proportion of people who
answered the question correctly, estimated level of diculty b b; standard error of the estimate,
and the topic of the question.15
Since both the level of diculty and knowledge parameters are latent variables, they are
only identied up to scale. Hence the value of b is only meaningful in relation to values of .
Figure 4 presents the distribution of knowledge scores and several item response curves. When
comparing values of  to values of b, it is useful to recall that an individual with  = b has a
50% probability of correctly answering the question.
To segment the sample into information groups s = 1;:::;S, we use cluster analysis. After
inspecting the distribution of ^ ; we set S = 5 and run Stata's kmeans function on the ability
measure. Table 3 demonstrates that the estimation procedure for  recovers values very similar to
citizens' raw score on all knowledge questions. Since the estimation procedure eectively equates
scores across dierent sets of knowledge questions, this similarity indicates that individuals
surveyed on dierent dates face comparably dicult questions. Note that the spread in raw
scores among the information status groups is quite large{individuals in the least informed
group, s = 1; answer 20% of the question correctly on average compared to the 88% average of
the most informed group, s = 5:
Table 3: Information status groups and raw scores
Summary of theta Summary of raw score
si Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
1 -1.719 -2.907 -1.131 0.198 0.071 0.300
2 -0.521 -1.104 -0.086 0.401 0.275 0.500
3 0.360 -0.077 0.775 0.589 0.500 0.667
4 1.223 0.807 1.751 0.746 0.667 0.833
5 2.388 1.808 3.149 0.878 0.800 0.929
All -.004 -2.907 3.149 0.506 0.071 0.929
Since individuals' knowledge scores are estimated by running separate logit regressions with
between 7 and 14 observations, measuring the uncertainty in the estimates of  is very impor-
tant. Table 4 summarizes uncertainty in the estimates of knowledge scores. The \Classied in
14Because we are trying to determine whether the individual \knows" the candidates' positions, we feel that
it is natural to treat an individual who simply admits that they \do not know" the same as one who had
demonstrated they do not know by answering incorrectly.
Very few individuals refused to answer: all of the questions had fewer than 0.6% of all respondents refuse to
answer.























































-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Knowledge Score (theta)
kdensity theta Assault Weapons Ban (2)
Social Security in Stocks Additional Stem Cell Lines
Increasing Minimum Wage Eliminating Estate Tax (1)
The dashed lines separate the knowledge groups
Knowledge Scores and Item Response Curves
Figure 4: Knowledge scores and item response curves
Group" columns give the average proportion of bootstrap iterations that fall within a particular
information group. The classication for the group 1 row can be interpreted as the probability
that an individual actually in group 1 is estimated to be in each of the other groups. Though
some groups are poorly distinguished from neighboring groups, all are well distinguished from
groups that are not adjacent to them.
Table 4: Information status groups and classication rates.
Classied in Group
Group Freq. Percent 1 2 3 4 5
1 4,549 18.72 0.786 0.188 0.023 0.003 0.000
2 7,630 31.39 0.236 0.519 0.195 0.044 0.006
3 6,082 25.02 0.030 0.256 0.420 0.234 0.060
4 4,232 17.41 0.002 0.043 0.215 0.453 0.287
5 1,812 7.46 0.000 0.001 0.029 0.198 0.771
4 Results
There are 3,148 individuals for whom we have estimates of ideological position ^ yi; and knowledge
^ . Of these, 1,608 voters (51.1%) voted for Bush. This proportion closely matches the 50.73%
from the actual election results.16 We nd that 78% of voters are closer to Kerry than to Bush
in ideological position. Overall, 65% of individuals vote for the candidate closer to them in the
weighted distance metric. However, this proportion diers greatly across the information status
groups, strictly increasing from 42% for the least informed group to 85% for the most informed
group.
16Ocial result as reported by the Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/
tables.pdf).4 RESULTS 15
Consider the hypothesis that individuals' vote is determined through a process analogous to
the model of opinion formation presented in Section 2.1: consider a random utility model where
the citizen's deterministic utility from each candidate is a function of the perceived distance
between their own ideological position and the candidate's. Though we cannot directly validate
such model, the observed patterns of voting behavior by information status group are consistent
with the hypothesis. Table 5 presents voting behavior by closer candidate and information
group.
The most informed group might be considered to be correctly perceiving the candidates'
ideological position and systematically voting for the closer candidate. Because a classication
rate of 85% is comparable to the rates for the policy issues presentable in Table 8, one could
reasonably attribute the 15% of votes given to the farther candidate to the random portion of
the utility function.
The least informed individuals who are closer to Kerry may be just as likely to vote for Bush
as the members of their group who are closer to Bush.17 The observed pattern is not inconsistent
with the hypothesis that citizens vote for the candidate they perceive to be closer to them: it is
reasonable for individuals who do not know where candidates stand on issues, and therefore in
the ideological space, to fail to vote systematically for the closer candidate.
Table 5: Voting by ideological position and information group
Closer to Kerry Closer to Bush
Group Vote Kerry Vote Bush Vote Kerry Vote Bush Vote Closer
1 82 153 17 43 125
27.80 51.86 5.76 14.58 42.37
2 279 317 25 109 388
38.22 43.42 3.42 14.93 53.15
3 360 281 33 172 532
42.55 33.22 3.90 20.33 62.88
4 413 174 14 187 600
52.41 22.08 1.78 23.73 76.14
5 292 60 5 84 376
66.21 13.61 1.13 19.05 85.26
all 1,444 1,005 96 603 2,047
45.87 31.93 3.05 19.16 65.03
If citizens are all perfectly informed and voting according to a random utility model analogous
to the model of opinion formation, equation 1 implies that a logit regression of the dummy
variable vote bush on u(yBjyi) and u(yKjyi) should give us coecients of one and negative one,
respectively, and a zero constant term. Regression (1) in Table 6 rejects this scenario at any
level of signicance, supporting the conclusion we drew from the descriptives: information status
matters and individuals are on average more likely to vote for the candidate closer to him in
17For all other information status groups, people closer to Bush are more likely to vote for Bush than those
closer to Kerry at any level of signicance.4 RESULTS 16
Table 6: Predicting voting behavior using ideological position and knowledge. Demographic
variables are measures of sex, age, race, education, income, religion, marital status, union mem-
bership, and military participation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit votebush votebush votebush votebush votebush votebush
u(yBjyi) 1.292 0.806 0.864
(0.070)** (0.087)** (0.096)**
u(yKjyi) -3.166 -2.413 -2.163
(0.129)** (0.168)** (0.186)**
u(yBjyi)  I(si = 1) -0.001 -0.251 -0.454
(0.172) (0.239) (0.269)
u(yBjyi)  I(si = 2) 0.89 0.595 0.726
(0.122)** (0.163)** (0.182)**
u(yBjyi)  I(si = 3) 1.515 1.13 1.149
(0.131)** (0.171)** (0.189)**
u(yBjyi)  I(si = 4) 2.122 1.654 1.617
(0.169)** (0.212)** (0.234)**
u(yBjyi)  I(si = 5) 2.578 1.783 1.987
(0.299)** (0.351)** (0.413)**
u(yKjyi)  I(si = 1) -0.645 -0.114 0.075
(0.174)** (0.22) (0.25)
u(yKjyi)  I(si = 2) -1.482 -0.895 -0.967
(0.141)** (0.156)** (0.175)**
u(yKjyi)  I(si = 3) -2.053 -1.399 -1.355
(0.141)** (0.162)** (0.179)**
u(yKjyi)  I(si = 4) -2.626 -1.899 -1.808
(0.167)** (0.194)** (0.214)**
u(yKjyi)  I(si = 5) -3.051 -2.048 -2.188
(0.268)** (0.309)** (0.365)**
Constant 10.097 3.758 8.483 2.07 6.958 1.684
(0.576)** (0.461)** (0.821)** (0.391)** (0.972)** (0.528)**
Demographic Variables No No No No Yes Yes
Party Identication No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3148 3148 3142 3142 2876 2876
McFadden's R2 0.34 0.32 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%5 CONLUSION 17
the ideological space.18
To capture the variation across information status groups, regression (2) allows the coe-
cients of utility to dier across information status groups by interacting the utility terms with
indicator variables. The coecients on utility increase in magnitude as individuals become more
informed{the dierences between coecients are signicant at the 1% level for all pairs of suc-
cessive groups except for groups four and ve. These results indicate utility from candidates'
policies is more correlated with voting behavior for more informed individuals.
Adding party identication does not change the results discussed above. Though the coe-
cients on party identication are suppressed in Table 6, party identication behaves as expected:
Republicans are much more likely to vote for Bush and Democrats for Kerry. Including both
party id and demographic variables preserves the patterns and the signicance of the coecients.
Though coecients of utility increase in magnitude as individuals become more informed, the
the level of signicance for the dierence between successive pairs of coecients falls from 1 to
12%. It is well established that demographic variables and party identication predict voting
behavior. Hence, it is noteworthy that our estimates of ideological position and information
status have explanatory power beyond these measures.
It is possible that demographic variables and party identication are correlated with unob-
served factors that cause individuals to vote for the candidate farther for them. Though we
cannot identify such a causal link, we investigate the relationship between demographic vari-
ables and the probability of voting for the farther candidate. The results of these regressions
are presented in Table 7.
Surprisingly, the coecients on many of the included demographic variables are not dis-
tinguishable from zero in all specications. Sex, age, and income are never signicant, nor is
residence in a union or military household. Coecients on race and martial status are signicant
in some but not all specications. Religion and party identication tell a consistent story.
Notice that Republicans closer to Kerry are much more likely to vote for the candidate farther
from them. Indeed, of the votes for the more distant candidate, 74% were cast by individuals
who are closer to Kerry and identify as Republican or lean Republican.
Born again Christians are more likely to vote for Bush independent of candidates' distance
from their ideological position: 60% of born again Christians closer to Kerry voted for Bush
and 89% of those closer to Bush voted for Bush.
5 Conlusion
Political knowledge is an important factor in understanding voting behavior, particularly when
voters' policy positions conict with those of their favored candidate. In this paper, we use
the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) for the 2004 U.S. election to directly estimate
voters' ideological positions, candidates' ideological positions, and voters' knowledge of candi-
dates' ideological positions. We then analyze the relationship between these estimates and the
individual's vote in the 2004 presidential election.
18To spatially interpret the coecients reported in Table 6, notice that introducing coecients on u(yBjyi) and
u(yKjyi) shifts the cutplane up and down, in the absence of a constant term. Adding a constant term changes
the shape of the set of policy positions from a line to a curve.5 CONLUSION 18
Table 7: Predicting the probability of voting for the more distant candidate
Logit (1) (2) (3)
u(yBjyi) 0.461 1.072 -3.757
(0.088)*** (0.134)*** (0.941)***
u(yKjyi) -1.087 -2.524 2.179
(0.133)*** (0.245)*** (0.893)**
i -0.335 -0.255 0.017
(0.051)*** (0.072)*** (0.169)
Democrat -1.354 -1.703 2.300
(0.207)*** (0.234)*** (0.629)***
Republican 1.460 2.197 -1.693
(0.206)*** (0.238)*** (0.605)***
Female 0.144 0.039 0.545
(0.115) (0.162) (0.412)
Age -0.002 -0.001 0.016
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013)
Black 0.034 -1.350 1.864
(0.241) (0.365)*** (0.812)**
Hispanic 0.388 0.699 -0.512
(0.256) (0.338)** (0.948)
Asian 0.507 -0.162 1.915
(0.522) (0.753) (1.374)
Education  HS diploma 0.180 0.108 -0.008
(0.147) (0.203) (0.496)
Education  bachelor's degree -0.278 -0.392 -0.285
(0.134)** (0.194)** (0.446)
Income < 25k -0.015 -0.093 0.509
(0.167) (0.229) (0.516)
Income > 100k 0.065 -0.006 0.222
(0.153) (0.221) (0.519)
Religious service attendance  weekly 0.213 0.275 -0.010
(0.120)* (0.168) (0.409)
Born again Christian 0.187 0.508 -1.372
(0.122) (0.175)*** (0.450)***
Not married, cohabitating 0.027 -0.302 0.736
(0.375) (0.495) (1.289)
Married -0.163 -0.023 -1.409
(0.145) (0.199) (0.500)***
Divorced -0.048 -0.291 -0.543
(0.188) (0.257) (0.560)
Military household 0.123 0.114 -0.159
(0.122) (0.174) (0.417)
Union household -0.151 -0.224 0.375
(0.153) (0.210) (0.505)
Closer to Kerry 3.989
(0.204)***
Constant -0.617 7.807 7.161
(0.715) (1.092)*** (4.845)
Observations 2834 2201 633
Sample Restriction None Closer to Kerry Closer to Bush
McFadden's R2 0.39 0.60 0.57
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%5 CONLUSION 19
The NAES asks voters for their own stances and for the candidates' stances on specic pol-
icy issues. Because candidates' stances on these policies are known, the data allow us to (1)
estimate voters' knowledge levels, using item response theory, and (2) simultaneously estimate
the positions of voters and candidates on the same spectrum. Typically, in the empirical litera-
ture, individuals' ideological positions are taken from self-reported placement on an ideological
spectrum. Here, we use Poole and Rosenthal's (1985, 2000) spatial model to estimate ideological
positions, treating individuals' opinions as Poole and Rosenthal treat roll-call data for legisla-
tors. This method recovers the underlying ideological space while avoiding the perception issues
associated with self-placement.
Assuming that voters prefer to vote for the candidate whose ideological position is closer
to their own, we nd that more knowledgeable individuals are far less likely to vote for the
candidate farther from them. Moreover, signicantly more voters vote \mistakenly" for Bush
than for Kerry. Though a majority of voters have ideological positions closer to Kerry, Bush
receives more votes due to this pattern of mistakes.
To put our results into a broader context, consider the exercise of placing actual voters who
identify with a party into three simplied categories: there are (1) voters who accurately know a
candidate's policy positions, agree with them simply because they identify with the candidate's
party, and vote for that candidate, (2) voters who accurately know a candidate's policy positions,
form their own independent opinions which happen to correspond to those of the candidate, and
vote for that candidate, and (3) voters who form their independent opinions regarding policies,
assume incorrectly that a candidate agrees with them since they identify with the candidate's
party, and vote for that candidate. This paper provides an estimate of how many voters fall
into the third category; these are the voters who vote for the candidate farthest from themselves
on the ideological spectrum while displaying low knowledge scores. However, our data do not
allow us to distinguish between voters in the rst two categories. Both the rst and second sets
of voters should, theoretically, vote for the ideologically closer candidate while receiving a high
knowledge score.6 APPENDIX 20
6 Appendix
Table 8: Classication rates and cutplanes for policy issues
Topic Predict favor Predict oppose Pffavorg > 0:50 if
favor oppose favor oppose
1 Bush Tax Cuts 0.49 0.09 0.07 0.35 y2 < 218:79y1   8:61
2 Estate Tax 0.67 0.14 0.03 0.16 y2 >  1:96y1   0:30
3 Estate Tax 0.44 0.20 0.10 0.26 y2 >  4:14y1   0:08
4 Overseas Tax Breaks, Job Creation 0.80 0.12 0.02 0.06 y2 > 0:21y1   0:51
5 Minimum Wage 0.79 0.08 0.02 0.11 y2 > 1:63y1   0:64
6 Union Organizing 0.51 0.13 0.10 0.26 y2 > 2:03y1   0:19
7 Trade Agreements 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 y2 < 0:22y1 + 0:05
8 Government Health Insurance for Children 0.75 0.09 0.03 0.12 y2 > 1:96y1   0:55
9 Government Health Insurance for Workers 0.65 0.12 0.05 0.18 y2 > 0:75y1   0:25
10 Medicare Drug Coverage 0.45 0.22 0.08 0.25 y2 < 9:11y1 + 0:66
11 Medicare Drugs from Canada 0.83 0.14 0.01 0.02 y2 <  5:42y1 + 2:46
12 Social Security in Stock Market 0.50 0.16 0.07 0.27 y2 < 2:96y1 + 0:14
13 School Vouchers 0.36 0.12 0.11 0.41 y2 >  62:48y1 + 4:49
14 Recalling Troops From Europe and Korea 0.68 0.20 0.03 0.09 y2 >  0:84y1   0:28
15 Reinstating Draft 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.79 y2 >  2:53y1 + 1:55
16 Banning All Abortions 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.70 y2 >  1:52y1 + 0:48
17 Restricting Abortion 0.32 0.06 0.08 0.55 y2 >  1:52y1 + 0:29
18 Stem Cell Funding (1) 0.73 0.09 0.02 0.16 y2 <  1:99y1 + 0:65
19 Stem Cell Funding (2) 0.67 0.10 0.04 0.19 y2 <  3:18y1 + 0:74
20 Additional Stem Cell Lines 0.64 0.09 0.04 0.23 y2 <  4:14y1 + 0:71
21 Federal Marriage Amendment 0.33 0.07 0.09 0.50 y2 >  1:66y1 + 0:25
22 State Law on Same-Sex Marriage 0.26 0.06 0.11 0.56 y2 <  2:13y1   0:09
23 Gays in Military 0.69 0.13 0.05 0.13 y2 > 3:61y1   0:85
24 Assault Weapons Ban 0.67 0.13 0.05 0.14 y2 > 0:80y1   0:28
25 Limiting Lawsuits 0.72 0.17 0.02 0.10 y2 < 3:11y1 + 0:69
26 Limiting Malpractice Awards 0.63 0.22 0.05 0.10 y2 >  3:76y1   0:45
The \Predict favor, oppose" column displays the proportion of voters who oppose the issue but are calculated
to be more likely to favor the issue.6 APPENDIX 21
Table 9: Wording of policy issue questions in the NAES survey
Issue Wording, followed by \do you favor or oppose this?" unless noted with *
1 Making recent federal tax cuts permanent
2 Completely eliminating the estate tax, that is, the tax on property left by people who die
3 Completely eliminating the estate tax, that is, the tax on property left by people worth
more than $1.5 million who die
4 Eliminating tax breaks for overseas prots and using money to cut taxes for businesses
that create jobs in the United States
5 Do you favor or oppose increasing the $5.15 minimum wage employers now must pay their
workers?*
6 Making it easier for labor unions to organize
7 The federal government negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA{do you favor
or oppose the federal government doing this?*
8 The federal government helping to pay for health insurance for all children
9 The federal government helping employers pay the cost of their workers' health insurance
10 The Medicare prescription drug law that was recently enacted
11 Changing the recently passed Medicare prescription drug law to allow re-importing drugs
from Canada
12 Do you favor or oppose allowing workers to invest some of their Social Security contributions
in the stock market?*
13 The federal government giving tax credits or vouchers to help parents send their children
to private schools
14 Moving 60,000 to 70,000 troops stationed in Europe and South Korea to other locations,
including the United States, in the next decade
15 Do you think the United States should put the military draft back into operation?*
16 The federal government banning all abortions|do you favor or oppose the federal govern-
ment doing this?*
17 Laws making it more dicult for a woman to get an abortion
18 Federal funding of research on diseases like Alzheimer's using stem cells taken from human
embryos
19 Federal funding of research on diseases like Parkinson's using stem cells taken from human
embryos
20 Making additional stem cell lines from human embryos available for federally funded re-
search on diseases like Parkinson's
21 Would you favor or oppose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution saying that no state
can allow two men to marry each other or two women to marry each other?*
22 Would you favor or oppose a law in your state that would allow two men to marry each
other or two women to marry each other?*
23 Should gays and lesbians be allowed to serve openly in the military, or shouldn't they be
allowed to serve openly?*
24 Extending the federal law banning assault weapons
25 Limiting the amount of money people can be awarded in lawsuits
26 The government placing limits on how much people could collect when a jury nds that a
doctor has committed medical malpractice6 APPENDIX 22
Table 10: Estimated diculty of knowledge questions.
Prop. Correct Diculty Std. Err. Topic of Question: Know if Bush or Kerry Favors...
1 0.667 -0.885 0.027 Tax Cuts
2 0.402 0.375 0.018 Eliminating Estate Tax (Wording #1)
3 0.459 0.431 0.019 Eliminating Estate Tax (Wording #2)
4 0.203 1.257 0.079 Reducing Estate Tax
5 0.344 0.479 0.031 Overseas Tax Breaks, Create Jobs (Wording #1)
6 0.531 -0.092 0.007 Overseas Tax Breaks, Create Jobs (Wording #2)
7 0.660 -0.655 0.022 Increasing Minimum Wage
8 0.581 -0.544 0.029 Making Union Organizing Easier (Wording #1)
9 0.629 -0.715 0.023 Making Union Organizing Easier (Wording #2)
10 0.488 -0.298 0.017 Government Health Insurance for Kids & Workers
11 0.560 -0.254 0.009 Government Health Insurance for Kids & Workers
12 0.565 -0.686 0.037 Medicare Prescription Law
13 0.548 -0.290 0.011 Drugs from Canada
14 0.516 0.097 0.011 Negotiating With Drug Companies
15 0.507 -0.132 0.005 Social Security in Stock Market
16 0.468 0.276 0.011 Moving Troops From Europe and Korea
17 0.480 0.102 0.014 Reinstating Draft
18 0.554 -0.070 0.015 Reinstating Draft
19 0.718 -1.678 0.112 Spending on Iraq and Afghanistan
20 0.669 -0.990 0.036 Patriot Act (Wording #1)
21 0.573 -0.344 0.018 Patriot Act (Wording #2)
22 0.194 1.842 0.074 *Know if Kerry Favors 9/11 Recommendations
23 0.715 -1.124 0.032 Making Abortion More Dicult
24 0.613 -0.629 0.022 Stem Cell Funding (Wording #1)
25 0.623 -0.668 0.022 Stem Cell Funding (Wording #2)
26 0.766 -1.350 0.041 Additional Stem Cell Lines
27 0.155 1.692 0.104 Assault Weapons Ban (Wording #1)
28 0.105 2.812 0.139 Assault Weapons Ban (Wording #2)
29 0.483 0.097 0.010 Limiting Lawsuits (Wording #2)
30 0.486 0.257 0.013 Limiting Malpractice Awards6 APPENDIX 23
Table 11: Wording of knowledge questions in the NAES survey
Wording: To the best of your knowledge,... { George W. Bush, John Kerry, both,
or neither?
Answer
1 Who favors making the recent tax cuts permanent Bush
2 Who favors completely eliminating the estate tax, that is, the tax on property left
by people who die
Bush
3 Who favors completely eliminating the estate tax, that is, the tax on property
worth more than $1.5 million left by people who die
Bush
4 Who favors reducing the estate tax, the tax on property left by people who die Bush
5 Who favors eliminating tax breaks for overseas prots of American corporations
and using the money to cut corporate income taxes
Kerry
6 Who favors eliminating tax breaks for overseas prots of American corporations
and using the money to cut taxes for businesses that create jobs in the United States
Kerry
7 Who favors increasing the $5.15 minimum wage employers must pay their workers Kerry
8 Who wants to make it easier for unions to organize Kerry
9 Who wants to make it easier for labor unions to organize Kerry
10 Who favors the federal government helping to pay for health insurance for all
children and helping employers pay the cost of the workers' health insurance
Kerry
11 Who favors a health insurance plan that would do both of the following|help to
pay for health insurance for all children and help employers pay the cost of the
workers' health insurance
Kerry
12 Who favors the Medicare prescription drug law that was recently enacted Bush
13 Who favors changing the recently passed Medicare prescription drug law to allow
re-importing drugs from Canada
Kerry
14 Who favors allowing the federal government to negotiate with drug companies for
lower prescription drug prices for senior citizens
Kerry
15 Who favors allowing workers to invest some of their Social Security contributions
in the stock market
Bush
16 Which candidate proposes moving 60,000 to 70,000 troops stationed in Europe and
South Korea to other locations, including the United States, in the next decade
Bush
17 Who favors reinstating the military draft Neither
18 which candidate has stated he favors reinstating the military draft Neither
19 who favored spending $87 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan last fall Bush
20 Who wants to extend all provisions of the USA Patriot Act in order to ght terrorism Bush
21 Who wants to extend all provisions of the USA Patriot Act Bush
22 * As far as you know, does John Kerry favor adopting all of the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, most of them, just some of them, or none of them?
Favors All
23 Who favors laws making it more dicult for a woman to get an abortion Bush
24 Who favors federal funding of research on diseases like Alzheimer's using stem cells
taken from human embryos
Kerry
25 Who favors federal funding of research on diseases like Parkinson's using stem cells
taken from human embryos
KerryREFERENCES 24
Table 11: Wording of knowledge questions in the NAES survey continuued
Wording: To the best of your knowledge,... { George W. Bush, John Kerry, both,
or neither?
Answer
26 Which candidate wants to make additional stem cell lines from human embryos
available for federally funded research on diseases like Parkinson's
Kerry
27 Who favors extending the federal law banning assault weapons Both
28 Who urges Congress to extend the federal law banning assault weapons Both
29 Who wants to limit the amount of money people can be awarded in lawsuits Bush
30 Who favors placing limits on how much people can collect when a jury nds that
a doctor has committed medical malpractice
Bush
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